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AbstrAct: in this paper H. S. Harris argues that it is misguided to suggest that Hegel’s 
philosophical project was a dialectical illusion generated by his historical situation and that he 
would never have believed that his vision was achievable if he had been faced with the world 
that we face today. not only does Harris proclaim himself to be a Hegelian, he claims that Hegel 
would today also remain a Hegelian. He goes on to argue that despite the fragmentation of the 
twentieth century and the apparent collapse of the vision articulated in the French Revolution, 
Hegel’s thinking continues to be relevant because although his philosophy is the ‘comprehension 
of one’s time’, Hegel also produces a philosophy that is out of time and somehow final. 
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if we can have a conference on the announced theme ‘Hegel Today’, it would seem 
that many of us must think that there is something still alive and relevant to our situation 
in Hegel’s thought. yet this does not entail that any of us must think that his basic 
project was valid. it is demonstrated easily, in fact, that some of the most intelligent and 
dedicated contemporary students of Hegel’s work have concluded that his philosophical 
project was a dialectical illusion generated by his historic situation; and that he would 
never have believed that what he set out to do was achievable, if he had been faced in 
his maturity with the world that we face. 
Thus emil Fackenheim concluded in the 1960s that ‘such are the crises which have 
befallen the Christian West in the last half-century that it may safely be said that, were 
he alive today, so realistic a philosopher as Hegel would not be a Hegelian’;2 and Charles 
Taylor concluded ten years later that ‘his actual synthesis is quite dead. That is, no one 
actually believes his central ontological thesis, that the universe is posited by a Spirit 
     1. [editors’ note: The editors of this volume would like to thank Jim devin, the executor of Harris’ papers 
for making this text available. The text is the ‘Presidential Address’ delivered on 2 october 1980 to the 
Hegel Society of  America meeting at Trent university, Peterborough, ontario. The presentation is previously 
unpublished and this version was transcribed from a typescript of the manuscript by Jim devin. Readers 
interested in the work of H. S. Harris should visit the digital repository of selected works, https://www.
library.yorku.ca/dspace/handle/123456789/883.
     2. emil Fackenheim, The Religious Dimension in Hegel’s Thought, Bloomington, indiana university Press, 
1967, p. 224; cf. also p. 12.
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whose essence is rational necessity’.3 others have arrived at a similar verdict for their 
own reasons, including our Vice President [Merold Westphal].4 But at this first confer-
ence in Canada i shall concentrate attention—honoris causa—upon these two Canadi-
ans. 
What these critics are saying is both very easy, and very difficult, to refute. Thus, 
one can refute Taylor’s empirical claim that ‘no one is a Hegelian today’ in the defined 
sense, by pointing to Clark Butler, who calms that Hegel’s diagnosis of his time led to 
a ‘comprehension of god, revolution and their inner identity’ which is precisely what 
our time needs because the revolution that began in 1789 is still on going.5 But Taylor’s 
generalization was plainly intended to cover only thinkers as ‘realistic as Hegel’ and (in 
spite of Taylor’s own record of youthful protest) one may doubt whether he would be 
seriously disturbed by the counterexample of one who is prepared to take the ‘counter-
culture’ of the 1950s and 1960s as evidence that the revolution is still on going. 
A far more impressive example can be offered in confirmation of Fackenheim’s thesis, 
and as the exception that proves the rule for Taylor’s. geoffrey Mure was committed to 
Hegel’s ‘central ontological thesis’ all his life. But he was too well schooled in the history 
of philosophy since Kant to affirm it categorically—and too careful a student of Hegel to 
be as sure as Taylor is, that it was indeed what Hegel meant to affirm. yet in his Idealistic 
Epilogue, published just before his death in 1979, he validates Fackenheim’s thesis that 
‘From so fragmented a world [as ours] the Hegelian philosophy would be forced to flee, 
as surely as neoplatonism was forced into flight from imperial Rome.… such a resort to 
flight would be tantamount to radical failure’.6 
Mure’s last verdict upon an academic career that began just before the First World 
War, reads thus: 
The fact is i am sick to death of the spectacle of humanity en masse. i don’t doubt 
that at least from the beginning of this century, perhaps earlier, the human species 
has declined in quality in inverse proportion to its increase in quantity; declined 
in thought and action, art and morality, indeed by any standard you can think of 
except perhaps health and expectation of life. leaving out black Africa, for which 
i have no figures, there are now more than three thousand million human beings 
alive, over-populating this planet by at least 40 percent. The majority of them 
are not significantly discriminable from one another and are, quite consistently, 
egalitarian in outlook so far as they have any outlook. The real danger with which 
     3. Charles Taylor, Hegel, Cambridge, Cambridge university Press, 1975, p. 538.
     4. Merold Westphal, History and Truth in Hegel’s Phenomenology, Atlantic Highlands, Humanities Press, 1979, 
pp. 199-200. it is fair to say, in criticism of Westphal’s ‘adherence’ to Fackenheim’s view, that it is internally 
inconsistent. For if Hegel could believe in the sort of millennium that Westphal ascribes to him, then he was 
never the hard-headed realist for which Fackenheim takes him. if Westphal agrees with Fackenheim about 
that—as i do—then he ought to have been driven to re-examine his own interpretation of the supposed final 
solution reached in the Phenomenology.
     5. Clark Butler, G. W. F. Hegel, Boston, Twayne Publishers, 1977, pp. 9-10. That Butler holds Hegel’s central 
ontological thesis in something like the form in which Taylor states it, is shown—in my opinion—by his 
declared allegiance to Whitehead’s philosophy of nature (see pp. 11, 174-77).
     6. Fackenheim, The Religious Dimension in Hegel’s Thought, p. 236.
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the uncontrolled proliferation of mankind threatens us is not starvation. Science for 
some time will produce a sufficient quantity of food at the expense of its quality to 
balance nature’s continuing production of more and more inferior human beings. 
The danger is that, after a little token bloodshed and a great deal of dishonourable 
appeasement, man will lie flattened under the tyrannies which egalitarianism 
inevitable begets. The old like me, as they take us to the concentration camp, will 
cry with Cleopatra, ‘The odds is gone, / And there is nothing left remarkable / 
Beneath the visiting moon’. That is why i shut my eyes and reflected on what an 
individual can be and has been.7 
if this is what the Hegelian ‘“peace” between faith and philosophy’ leads to at the pres-
ent time, then we may well feel, like Fackenheim, that ‘The time is not ripe for the 
self-elevation of thought to the divine side of the divine-human relation, for no time has 
this kind of ripeness’.8 Mure looks back to the world before 1914 as a time of ‘ripeness’. 
on the other side, Merold Westphal thinks that the author of the Phenomenology looked 
forward to a time of ‘ripeness’ instead of what actually came to pass between 1814 and 
1914. Both of them are mistaken in their conception of ‘ripeness’. The optimistic Hegel 
of 1807 did learn indeed that he was mistaken in 1814. But Hegel as a philosopher never 
needed that lesson (if he had needed it, he would after 1814 have denounced the prophetic 
pretensions, which Westphal claims to find in the Phenomenology, as violently after 1814 as 
he denounced the philosophical prophecies after that date). He lived in two times: a time 
of social hope and a time of social despair (for that is how the century that Mure looks 
back to with homesick longing appeared to Hegel as it opened). For Hegel personally, 
the time of social hope was a period in which he was driven as near to despair as he was 
capable of coming; while the time of social despair was for him personally the moment 
of success and universal recognition. He well might have come to the conception of phi-
losophy that he held in those last years because of this complex reversal: and his doctrine 
of the ‘ripeness’ of his time then might have rested upon the experienced ambivalence of 
the ‘times’ in his experience. But in fact he did not come to his view in this way; and the 
only difference that Hegel’s experience of the ‘carrousel of time’ makes to his concept of 
its ‘ripeness’ is that it enables us to demonstrate that he was always fully conscious that 
systematic philosophy as ‘time comprehended’ is ‘absolute’, that is to say not dependent 
upon any time at all. We can show this, because Hegel already maintained in the good 
time, both that the ‘comprehending of one’s time’ was the highest achievable goal, and 
that philosophy, because it rises out of its time by comprehending it, cannot presume to 
give practical advice for its own particular time. We find these two lessons in early texts 
from successive years (1801-1802); and we find them again, repeated side by side in the 
     7. g. R. g. Mure, Idealist Epilogue, oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978, pp. 174-75.
     8. Fackenheim, The Religious Dimension in Hegel’s Thought, p. 240. This is actually the foundation of one of 
two extremes that Fackenheim distinguishes in ‘post-Hegelian religious thought’. He says himself that ‘philo-
sophic thought must move beyond the extremes of partisan commitments’ (p. 241) but he does not say how. 
He leaves me, however, with the impression that the thesis i have quoted represents for him the abiding 
truth of this extreme—cf., p. 49.
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bad time to which the Preface of the Philosophy of  Right was addressed.9 
one way in which those who say that ‘Hegel today would not be a Hegelian’—or 
that no rational observer of today’s world can be one, which is the same thing—plainly 
contradict themselves, and themselves ‘Hegelians’ of a sort is here revealed. They all 
agree with Hegel’s definition of philosophy as ‘its own time grasped in thoughts’. What 
they cannot see is how the ‘comprehension of one’s time’ can possibly produce a phi-
losophy that is out of  time and somehow final. if they could see that, they would agree, i 
assume, that it is legitimate to be a ‘Hegelian today’ (and that Hegel himself, the model 
philosopher from whom they all alike accept the definition of philosophy’s problem as 
comprehension of the time, would a fortiori still be a ‘Hegelian’ today or on any other 
day). They would agree with this, i think, even though they might not be converted to 
Hegelianism in the full or systematic sense themselves. (nothing, i am convinced, ever 
would convert Fackenheim. The claim that ‘there is but one Reason. There is no second 
super-human Reason. Reason is the divine in man’10 offends him—upon his interpreta-
tion of it—by its positive presumption. upon the interpretation that i shall offer here, it 
will offend him almost as much by its negative presumption—it denies too much; it would 
require him to give up something too precious to him to be surrendered—namely, his 
religious faith.)11 
The solution to the problem of how time finally can be transcended is simpler than 
one expects. That is why it goes unrecognized. First, to ‘comprehend a time’ involves 
comprehending the way in which all previous times are relevant to it. Thus there is at 
all times a common structure in the endeavour to comprehend one’s time; and any effort 
to comprehend a previous time that is known to one is peculiarly relevant to one’s own 
effort in this time. everything that counts for one as such an effort is ‘philosophy’; and 
in virtue of the fact that it only qualifies as philosophy so far as one can (and has) suc-
     9. For 1801-02 compare the ‘Resolution’ poem (Johannes Hoffmeister, Dokumente zu Hegel’s Entwichlung, 
Frommann, Stuttgart, 1936, p. 388): ‘Bessers nicht als die Zeit, aber auf ’s Reste, sie seyne’ and the introduc-
tion to the essay on the Constitution of  Germany—‘The thoughts contained in this essay can have no aim or 
effect, when published, save that of promoting the understanding of what is, and therefore a calmer outlook 
and a moderately tolerant attitude alike in words and in actual contact [with affairs]. For it is not what is 
that makes us irascible and resentful, but the fact that it is not as it ought to be. But if we recognize that it is 
as it must be, i.e. that it is not arbitrariness and chance that make it what it is, then we also recognize that 
it is as it ought to be. yet it is hard for the ordinary run of men to rise to the habit of trying to recognize 
necessity and to think it. Between events and the free interpretation of them they insert a mass of concepts 
and aims and require what happens to correspond with them. And when doubtless the case is nearly always 
otherwise, they excuse their concepts on the plea that while what dominated them was necessity what dom-
inated the event was chance. Their concepts are just as restricted as their insight into things, which indeed 
they interpret as mere isolated events, not as a system of events ruled by a single spirit….’ (g. lasson , ed., 
Schriften zur Politik und Rechtsphilosophie, leipzig, Meiner, 2nd ed., 1923, p. 5; Hegel’s Political Writings, trans. T. 
M. Knox with an introductory essay by Z. A. Pelczynski, oxford, Clarendon Press, 1964, p. 145[one small 
revision made to translation]); the relevant passage from the Preface of the Philosophy of  Right is in lasson, p. 
16 (Hegel’s Philosophy of  Right, trans. T. M. Knox, oxford, Clarendon Press, 1952, p. 11).
     10. g. W. F. Hegel, Einleitung in der Geschichte der Philosophie, Johannes Hoffmeister (ed.), leipzig, Meiner, 
1940, p. 123 (cf. Fackenheim, The Religious Dimension in Hegel’s Thought, p. 223).
     11. cf. Fackenheim, The Religious Dimension in Hegel’s Thought, p. 12.
H. S. HARRiS 9
cessfully related it to one’s own effort, one must always be able to speak of philosophy 
as ‘perennial’, (or as being able to speak of philosophy as ‘perennial’, (or as being one 
and the same at all times).12 Secondly, Hegel’s time is ‘ripe’ because it is now that this 
comprehension of what philosophy is has been reached. Hegel can be sure that it could 
not have been reached earlier—no previous time could have reached it—because his 
concept of spirit as the community of rational inquirers, or as the continuing dialogue of 
those who are striving to grasp how humanity structures its life-world in its ambiguous 
pursuit of natural satisfaction ‘happiness’ and self-expression for contemplative appre-
ciation (‘freedom’), presupposes Kant’s Copernican revolution—i.e. it presupposes the 
recognition that real, objective, scientific cognition does not tell us the way things are 
‘in themselves’ but the way they are ‘for us’. Because of this subjective structure of all finite 
cognition, the absolute of what [is] is ‘in and for itself ’, not the direct or intuitive aware-
ness of what is ‘in itself ’. 
in a sense, of course, this insight was old news. There is a long traditional of ‘peren-
nial philosophy’ before Hegel.13 But that earlier tradition depended on the faith (or the 
dogmatic assumption supported by ‘proofs’ which had only a dialectical validity) that 
‘what is’ is a self-conscious Being, who reveals Himself to us, His finite creatures, truth-
fully, because He is infinitely good. it was, of course, this great tradition that una veritas 
in variis signis varie resplendent (to borrow a tag from one of the great exponents of the 
philosophia perennis, nicholas of Cusa) that Hegel wanted to take over. But he wanted both 
to translate it into post-Kantian terms, and to incorporate the philosophic traditions 
of unself-conscious naturalism and/or dualism. He could only overcome the Kantian 
dialectic between these different traditions if he could show that there is a real absolute 
Subject in human cognition (not just a ‘logical form’ furnished with a set of categories 
peculiarly adapted to make newton’s physics and the sociology of Hobbes and locke 
appear as the eternal truth). But what subject is there in our experience for whom the 
self-positing power of Fichte’s ego can be claimed, without our being required to ven-
ture into acts of faith that must inevitably generate ‘unbelievers’? only the human com-
munity, as sharing the common duty and delight of knowing the world as its home, and 
exploring and forever extending its free range of self-expression in that home, can be 
     12. Many texts repeat this point at all stages of Hegel’s career—from the Difference essay (g. W. F. Hegel, 
The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of  Philosophy, trans. H. S. Harris and Walter Cerf, Albany, 
Sate university of new york Press, 1977, p. 114) to the Einleitung in der Geschichte der Philosophie of november 
1827. But this last is perhaps the passage that comes closest to saying exactly what i am saying: ‘Philosophy 
is Reason that grasps in the mode of thinking, brings itself to consciousness, so that it becomes Gegenstand 
[an ob-ject] for itself or knows itself in the form of thought. This producing, the fact that it knows of itself, 
is thus also one only—just one and the same thinking. Hence there is strictly just one philosophy only. Much 
may be called by the name of philosophy though it is not.—We have nothing of our own [Spezielles] before 
us, for philosophy is the thinking spirit in world-history’ (Hegel, Einleitung in der Geschichte der Philosophie, pp. 
123-24). [For another translation refer to Hegel’s Introduction to the Lectures on the History of  Philosophy, trans. T. 
M. Knox and A. V. Miller, oxford, Clarendon Press, 1985, p. 92.]
     13. The expression philosophia perennis was coined, i think, by the italian humanist Agostino Steuco, and 
its most notable popularizer was perhaps Robert, Cardinal Bellarmine—but the concept is medieval and 
possibly Hellenistic.
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the subject for which the ‘order’ of nature, and the dialectical disorder of history exists. 
Thus ‘philosophy is the thinking spirit in world-history’; and the self-formative or phe-
nomenological problem of the philosopher is to raise himself to the standpoint of this 
real transcendental subjectivity. From this standpoint the maxim, homo sum, nihil humani a 
me alienum puto will embrace all the ways there are of knowing and relating to the objective 
world, as well as to one another; and the true significance of the ‘postulate of immortal-
ity’ will be found precisely in the possibility of obeying the maxim. 
That is the easy part; for it is hard to contest the claim that Hegel’s Phenomenology 
could not well have been written any sooner than it was. even to imagine it being writ-
ten more clearly, by somebody else at that time, becomes difficult when we reflect that 
nobody we know of understood Hegel’s version then and there; and only a scattering 
of readers seem to have understood it ever since. yet the conviction that philosophy is 
the comprehension of one’s time is widely shared, and the knowledge that we owe this 
conviction to Hegel, though not universal among those who share it, is certainly not 
uncommon. 
What is harder to grasp is why Hegel was sure that his own comprehension of what 
‘comprehending the time’ involves would not itself be transcended in some future com-
prehension of the time. We shall only see why his insight into the problem of what 
‘comprehending the time’ is has a colourable claim to be as ultimate as the logical prin-
ciples of identity, contradiction and excluded middle are in certain modes of formal 
discourse, when we understand clearly what that insight was. it never ceases to astound 
me personally—for whom this was almost the first thing i really understood in Hegel, a 
beacon that has shed light ever more widely on the theoretical puzzles of his work over 
more than thirty years of studying it since—that in spite of Hegel’s perpetual trumpeting 
about the ‘identity’ of (Christian) religion and philosophy, Hegel’s most crucial debt to 
the gospel, is so seldom clearly understood. 
The French proverb says ‘tout comprendre, c’est tout pardonner’. This is one of those 
axioms of ‘gesunder Menschenverstand’ that takes on a somewhat Pickwickian sense when it 
get its proper ‘speculative’ interpretation. For when we comprehend everything philo-
sophically we do necessarily forgive it. What is necessary has minimally to be accepted 
or recognized rather than forgiven—the ‘forgiveness’ of what is at all times beyond our 
power is pointless. yet Hegel does not characterize even this ‘recognition of necessity’ as 
the admission of justice: to see that things must be as they are is to see that ‘they are as 
they ought to be’. Thus he makes all recognition of necessity into an anticipation of the 
rationality of ‘forgiveness’; and he does so because forgiveness, whenever it is appropri-
ate, is a higher level of reason than the recognition of justice. in human (or ‘spiritual’) 
relations forgiveness is the only self-sufficient rationality, for it is what the recognition of 
necessity properly leads to; and in freeing us from the tyranny of the demand for ‘jus-
tice’, the granting of the pardon shows us that we are indeed free—that freedom is not 
a ‘postulate’ but an experience, an actuality to which we can rise at any moment—just 
as Jesus taught when he counselled us to ‘love your enemies’, ‘Bless them that persecute 
you’ and so on. 
H. S. HARRiS 11
Hegel recognized the three realms of Absolute Spirit as the ‘real presence’ of the 
‘Kingdom of god’ which the unhellenized Jew, Jesus of nazareth proclaimed to his peo-
ple; and he saw that the spirit of charity is ‘resurrected’ in every man who enters those 
realms (just as the hellenized Jew, Paul, proclaimed to the gentiles) because one cannot 
enter the world of universal human culture without putting the one sided partisanship 
of practical life behind one. Milton’s Paradise Lost belongs to the Hegelian Kingdom of 
god because Shelly, for instance, can recognize the human ‘heroism’ of Milton’s Satan. 
This kind of recognition does not mean one must ‘forgive’ everything that one opposes 
in the ordinary world (as the youthful author of the Necessity of  Atheism certainly opposed 
Milton’s ‘Christianity’ for example). Also it is true that, for Hegel—as for Jesus—there 
is such a thing as the ‘sin against the Spirit’—for which there is no forgiveness. i cannot 
engage to discuss that now, for it seems to me to take several forms and i am not sure i 
can classify them, still less provide a rational ‘phenomenology’ for them. But a marvel-
lously clear example is provided by the report—which i am assuming to be true simply 
because it so providentially apt—that eichmann claimed that he had tried always to 
live in accordance with the Categorical Imperative. This puts him beyond the range of the 
prayer ‘Father forgive them, for they know not what they do’. He is beyond the range of 
any of the ambiguous senses of ‘not knowing’ because the second formula of the Categori-
cal Imperative (‘always to treat humanity as an end, and never as a means only’) was the 
clearest philosophical expression of man’s rational self-comprehension in practical rela-
tions before Hegel. it took Hegel himself several years of hard thinking to see that Jesus 
had already grasped what ‘respect for humanity’ involved far better than Kant ever did; 
and it is the conviction that he, Hegel, has finally found a logical way to express what 
Jesus understood that makes him confident that his comprehension of what man’s task 
of self-comprehension is will not be transcended. it is logically impossible to assert as a 
matter of definite necessity that Hegel’s confidence is absolutely warranted. The essence 
of rational speech requires us to recognize its absolute freedom in this direction. one of 
the reasons why, whether we believe in god or not, we must construct our philosophical 
logic without speaking of Him (except in non-logical metaphors) is that no word uttered 
by human tongue or pen can have the absolute finality of ‘god’s’ Word as conceived 
in the older philosophia perennis. But before i let this logical limit trouble my confident 
acceptance of Hegel’s ‘absolute knowledge’ as absolute, (at least) what it might mean 
to ‘transcend’ the religious definition of man’s vocation as ‘loving god (the god who 
is love) and his neighbour as himself.’ i confess that i do not know (cannot ‘conceive’) 
what a ‘transcending’ of that formula would be like—i.e., a philosophical doctrine that 
makes it look as inadequate as Hegel made Kant’s moral philosophy look to me beside 
it. Because Hegel’s philosophy has done that for me, i am confident that the new philoso-
phia perennis will indeed prove perennial. Since i am thus content to proclaim myself a 
‘Hegelian today’ (in defiance of Charles Taylor), it hardly needs stating that i claim that 
severest of realists, Hegel, as a Hegelian likewise (in defiance of emil Fackenheim). 
But where does the ‘realism’ come in? Well, the Phenomenology brings the whole range 
of human moral attitudes, from that of Cain to that of novalis, within the range of 
CoSMoS And HiSToRy12
Christian charity, by showing us that the self-conscious appearance of ‘charity’ itself 
requires them. Thus it turns ‘Father, forgive them …’ into ‘do you, against whom we 
trespass, forgive us, as we in turn forgive you’. (The confluence of ‘Conscience’ with 
‘The Manifest Religion’ shows us how we both can and must return from the Hobbesian 
Terror to the civilly unequal struggle for liberty and equality, in a spirit of fraternity that 
rests on the clear awareness of our equal helplessness to avoid offence, and of our actual 
freedom to forgive one another in spite of that. Thus we can also maintain an equal 
respect for conscience in spite of its inevitable ‘badness’. 
This general recognition of ‘freedom of conscience’ can be institutionalized in our 
public life; and it is institutionalized in the modern state. Freedom of conscience can-
not be ‘perfect’ according to any concept that conscience can form for itself, because 
the only conceptual ‘perfection’ possible here is the recognition that imperfection is logi-
cally inevitable, and morally necessary. The modern state is thus the only ‘perfect’ actuality 
that practical Reason can have, because life must always proceed all the way from the 
‘unwisdom’ of wealth (the pursuit of material or natural happiness) to the quest for the 
Hegelian kingdom of god. Free civil life is bound to contain injustice and inequality of 
opportunity, because neither ‘justice’ nor ‘equality’ can be defined in an uncontrovert-
ibly mandatory way; and since our civil existence must contain the ‘pursuit of happiness’ 
(the freedom to define human happiness for oneself is the foundation of ‘conscience’—in 
other words it is the very earth upon which Jesus once went round forgiving sins, and 
upon which alone He can be resurrected as the spirit of the community) the modern 
state necessarily contains the seeds of its own destruction. Whether those seeds will ger-
minate into a struggle for life that finally destroys the ethical bond of our earthly City, 
philosophy cannot tell us; and the ‘actual rationality’ of this ignorance arises from the 
fact that the outcome here depends upon our free use of our own reason. Hegel knew 
that, far from being spiritually ‘perfect’, the bourgeois world is utterly ‘without wisdom’ 
in its worship of Mammon; and more than forty years before Marx, he saw and said 
both that the ‘Wealth of nations’ is the angel of death for the nations, and that the ab-
stract rationalization of labour (with an apparently consequent lightening of the burdens) 
destroys the concrete rationality of life as human work. 
Fackenheim remarks that ‘Hegel never despaired of the modern bourgeois, Prot-
estant world’. i suspect that, existentially speaking, Hegel sometimes did despair just 
as—with so much more evident reason—i sometimes do. (For Hegel was a better social 
logician than i am, and hence much more farsighted, as my remarks about his early 
analysis of Adam Smith was designed to show). But despair is no more a philosopher’s 
business than hope. The philosopher must look at ‘what is’ (in and for itself) and show 
what sort of rationality it actually has. Where the Begriff is in stable equilibrium its insti-
tutional actuality will have the rationality of charity, for the whole community will be 
agreed about it, and the spirit of mutual respect and forgiveness will make its perceived 
‘injustices’ (various and conflicting as they must be from the different active standpoints 
that social life offers) bearable for all parties: but so far as the Begriff is in motion (or ‘alien-
ated’ or ‘for itself the opposite of itself ’) it will have only the rationality of justice—that 
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is to say we shall be faced with a social problem, a conflict that is in the stage of ‘judge-
ment’, but not yet resolved.14 This is how the ongoing mechanization of society appeared 
to Hegel in his own time. He could only analyse the necessity of the process. if he did 
not despair, it was mainly because war, ‘the judgement of god’, was always present to 
save his world. He had seen a war of national preservation save the French Revolu-
tion from the egalitarian extremism of the Terror; then napoleon went down to defeat 
in the second war—the war for the national salvation of europe—leaving Hegel in a 
world that he compared to imperial Rome because no spiritual star was visible. But he 
could expect still confidently that a war of national preservation would put things right 
in the godless conflict of bourgeoisie and proletariat, before the worship of Mammon 
destroyed the sanctuary of Absolute Spirit from which the new star would be recognized 
whenever it did finally arise.15 
This is the only respect in which our situation has significantly developed since 
Hegel’s time. Hegel would not have been surprised to see Jean Juarez and his socialist 
brothers (including Mussolini) turn into patriotic nationalist in 1914. He also would have 
been rightly proud of Benedetto Croce’s defence of the cultural kingdom in which all are 
always brothers, and wrongly contemptuous of Bertrand Russell’s resolute pacifism. But 
the awful ‘motion of the Concept’ from 1914 to 1945 has brought now to birth a world 
in which the ‘rationalization of labour’ has given war quite a new functional meaning. 
i was nineteen when the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima—Hegel was nineteen when 
the Bastille fell. And i know that something cataclysmic had happened just as surely 
as he did. But the difference between us can be estimated from the fact that i did not 
see the relevance of Hiroshima to the nuremberg trials then at all. That ‘the waging of 
aggressive war’ should be declared a ‘crime against humanity’ seemed to me absurd. (i 
then had not read Hegel, but i could see that ‘the world’s history is the court of judge-
ment’ without being told.) yet i see not that the solemn confirmation of god’s ‘justice’ 
     14. This failure to distinguish between these two levels of ‘rationality’ is the main reason why Charles 
Taylor is obliged to conclude that Hegel’s ideal of systematic logical necessity cannot be reconciled with his 
ideal of free self-expression. The ‘necessity’ of Hegelian logic can only be, in Taylor’s view, what Hegel him-
self calls ‘the unbending righteous self-sameness’ of Spirit as ‘substance’, see Hegel, g. W. F., Phänomenologie 
des Geistes, Johannes Hoffmeister (ed.), Hamburg, Meiner 1952, p. 314 [Phenomenology of  Spirit, trans. A. V. 
Miller, oxford, Clarendon Press, 1977, ¶ 439]. But self-conscious rationality—Spirit as Subject is the Aufhebung 
of this ‘righteous self-sameness’ in the free use of one’s Reason. This involves the initial irrationality of follow-
ing one’s own ‘conscience’—and it only gains a substantial rational ground in the community’s recognition 
and forgiveness.
     15. Perhaps he was more confident than he should have been. But the expulsion of the Turkish imperial 
power from europe, the gradual advance of human rights in Russia, and the eventual downfall of the Rus-
sian and Austrian empires in a war which ended in the proclamation of the Wilsonian principle of national 
self-determination, all seem to me to testify to the essential soundness of his claim that ‘if we were to pre-
suppose a ruler in europe, who acted according to his whim, and took a notion to make half of his subjects 
slaves, we should be conscious that this would not work even though he were to use the most extreme force’, 
Geschichte der Philosophie, Einleitung, Johannes Hoffmeister, 1940, p. 233—the passage comes from several stu-
dent transcripts of 1823. in the world of superpowers, computers, and atomic war Hegel would be quick to 
recognize that the situation has changed. Practical Hegelianism in the shadow of Nineteen Eighty-four [1949 
(transcriber’s addition)] cannot be quite what it was in 1824.
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upon nazi germany by a court of bourgeois judges was absolutely appropriate—though 
it was not the nazis but their victorious judges who first waged war in a way that made 
it an evident crime against humanity. (The nazis had enough genuine crimes against 
humanity on their conscience without that one, so there is and was—as i saw at the 
time—no need to be sorry for the leaders who were punished civilly.) 
War is only ‘the judgement of god’ now, in the sense that a world war like the one 
that Hitler started would be the last Judgement, literally. By making the last Judgement 
present visibly as a technological achievement of our very own, we have driven god 
from his last vestige of a throne. it is now visibly we who sit in judgement upon ourselves 
in our history. Can the Church of  Reason, whose true founder and only father was Hegel, 
control the State of  Reason (which the men who followed Jesus, and ultimately luther and 
the Reformers founded, but which took its sceptre of sovereign power from Bacon and 
the scientific enlightenment)? The control has to be exercised through what Plato called 
the ‘persuasion of necessity by Reason’ because that is how the realm of natural neces-
sity is organized into the world of rational freedom. i do not know, and logically I know 
why I cannot know, how our fate will turn out. But there are some relevant things that i do 
know about it. As a student of Hegel’s ethics i can see that it is morally wrong to repine 
about the egalitarian aspirations of the underprivileged millions on this over-populated 
planet (as Mure does); and i understand why in the universal community which the 
economic and technological growth imperative of the scientific enlightenment created, 
as the structural context of this problem of over-population, the possibilities of error 
and the penalties of failure are greater and more terrible than they were in the world of 
the national communities which ‘the judgement of god’ could purge and keep healthy 
by the periodic experience of warfare. The wars that are possible now, are exactly and 
only what that utilitarian, von Clausewitz, said war is: ‘nothing but the prosecution of 
policy by other means’. A genuine life and death struggle must be avoided because it 
could prove altogether too final. Because of this Mure’s gloomy forebodings about ‘ap-
peasement’ and ‘tyranny’ may prove to be correct. But even that outcome will not show 
that Hegel ought to have despaired of the political world in which ‘liberty, equality and 
fraternity’ had for the first time become real possibilities. Rather it was his task to show 
(as he did), the meaning of liberty, the dialectical ambivalence of equality, and the price of 
fraternity—respect for the ‘conscience’ of the Vicar of Bray16 is such an affront to ‘good 
sense’, and the Protestant ‘earnestness’, that Charles Taylor can suppose that Hegel is 
being ironic about it! 
Philosophy cannot produce the millennium, or even guarantee its continuance 
supposing—per impossible—that it was to produce itself. Rather it is the case that, in the 
fullness of time (i.e. when we had gained a comprehensive grasp of what our rational 
freedom is and what it must aim at) philosophy could show us why there is no millen-
     16. [Transcriber’s note: From The Oxford Encyclopedic English Dictionary, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991—‘The 
Vicar of Bray is the hero of an 18th
 
century song who kept his benefice from the reign of Charles ii to the 
reign of george i by changing his beliefs to suit the times. The song is apparently based on an anecdote of 
an identified vicar of Bray, Berkshire, in T. Fuller’s Worthies of  England (1662).’]
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nium. This is the ‘self-positing Spirit whose essence is rational necessity’ which Taylor 
says that no one nowadays can believe in. i say that, on the contrary, every rational 
person today is fully conscious of the negative presence of this spirit (as the justice of the 
‘fate’ that we have yet to bring upon ourselves). Few of us have much confidence in its 
saving power, when we contemplate the appalling problems (and costs) of establishing 
any charitably endurable measure of social justice in the world community as a whole. 
But we do not therefore have to ‘fly from the world’. Mure’s claim that the world is al-
ready forty percent overpopulated is the measure of his deepest despair here. How can 
a Hegelian say that what is ought not to be, or a Christian borrow the answer of Cain?17 
Those who do not fly from the problem, but regard this despair as selfish and cowardly 
(as i do) merely see that the cycle of growth has somehow got to be stopped. To believe 
that ought implies can here is to admit the saving capacity of reason, to recognize the posi-
tive presence of the Spirit, its existence as moral necessity, i.e., as freedom and as charity 
it is not a very comfortable home that we have made for ourselves in this world. But the 
absolute philosophy is the one that shows us that it is our home, and that we are the ones 
who have built it. The only comfort that philosophy can add to its amenities must come 
from our understanding why it is idle to look for comfort in it. That insight is, indeed, 
as cold as any comfort Job was offered. But it remains nonetheless the absolute truth that 
‘Ich ist in der Welt zu Hause; wenn es sie kennt, noch mehr wenn es sie begriffen hat’.18
H. S. Harris (1926-2007) 
york university 
Canada
     17. [editors’ note: in response to god’s question ‘where is Abel thy brother?’ Cain replied ‘Am i my 
brother’s keeper?’ genesis 4:9]
     18. [editors’ note: ‘i am at home in the world when i know it, still more so when i have understood it’ 
(Hegel, Philosophy of  Right,  § 4A).]
